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LABOR LAW-BETWEEN THE OBVIOUS AND THE FOOLISH 1 : AN
ApPLICATION OF UCC PRINCIPLES TO THE COMMON LAW OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

An employer and a labor union representing several hundred
employees enter into an agreement purportedly governing the
working relationship between the company and the employees. As
a matter of day-to-day practice, however, things are done a little
differently than the written agreement seems to prescribe. After a
period of several years, the Company notifies the Union and the
employees that it desires to return to a strict observance of the
terms of the contract. The Union protests that current practices
were in place before the formation of the latest written agreement
and have become part of the most recent contract. The Union goes
on to argue that the Company may not unilaterally alter those prac
tices without negotiating. This situation is further complicated by
the fact that the most recent writing contains both a no-oral-modifi
cations (NOM) clause and a merger clause. 2
The federal courts, in mitigating disputes between the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement,3 are bound to create and
amend the federal common law of collective bargaining agreements
1. Clyde W. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE
L.J. 525 (1969). In this article, Professor Summers presented what he believed to be an

unpopular suggestion: that the law of collective bargaining agreements could broaden
our understanding of contract law. To his detractors, he issued the following warning:
One who views contract law from the perspective of labor law, and whose
last working contact with contract law was twenty years ago, should perhaps
be cautious in venturing broad pronouncements on the subject. The risk is
great that what may be said here will fall between the two stools of the obvi
ous and the foolish. But collective agreements are contracts, though long
treated as disowned offspring; and the law of collective agreements should
have something to add to our understanding of the law of contracts.
Id. at 562.
2. The combination of a NOM clause and a merger clause within a written con
tract will be referred to throughout this Note as a "zipper clause." See infra notes 55-57
and accompanying text.
3. Collective bargaining agreements may be defined as "contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting com
merce." Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301,61 Stat. 156,29 U.S.C. § 185
(1988).
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in accordance with the policies of national labor law.4 The Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 indicates that the utmost prior
ity of national labor law is to "promote the full flow of commerce."5
Correspondingly, national labor law seeks to facilitate smooth and
productive relationships between employers, unions, and the repre
sented employees. 6
The function of a collective bargaining agreement is to govern
the working relationship between an employer, a union, and the
represented employees. 7 Proper interpretation of such agreements
must be rooted in an understanding of the unique nature of collec
tive bargaining and the policies that national labor law supports. 8
One might argue that the goals of national labor policy may be
achieved only through a strict reading of the terms that the parties
themselves have chosen. Suchan interpretation provides parties
with certainty and confidence that the terms of their contract will
be upheld. However, courts might recognize the impossibility of
forecasting every possible contingency that might occur within the
employer/employee relati<;>nship and allow a reasonable amount of
flexibility in the face of the unknown. This interpretation leaves the
collective bargaining agreement as a realistic framework that guides
the decisions of the parties as they work together.
Part I of this Note outlines the statutory background of collec
tive bargaining agreements under the National Labor Relations Act
as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Part
I goes on to delineate the facts of Martinsville Nylon Employees
Council v. NLRB,9 trace the procedural history of the case, and
summarize the majority and dissenting opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Part II begins
4. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,456 (1957).
5. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § l(b), 29 U.S.c. § 141(b) (1988).
6. Id. The purpose of the Act is as follows:
It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers
in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful proce
dures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the
other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor
organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe prac
tices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are
inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in con
nection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
Id.

7. Watson v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 399 F.2d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 1968).
8. Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 456.
9. 969 F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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with an analysis of the problems that are created by enforcing a
zipper clauselo within a collective bargaining agreement. It then
goes on to stress the similarities between a long-term contract for
the sale of goods and a collective bargaining agreement and recom
mends an application of the principles of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") to the unique context of collective
bargaining.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background
A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is an enforceable
contract under section 301 of the Management Labor Relations Act
of 1947 (the "Act").l1 The Act further provides that district courts
of the United States possess jurisdiction to hear controversies aris
ing between the parties to a CBA regardless of the citizenship of
the parties or the amount in controversy.12 The policies giving rise
to this legislation are outlined in section 1 of the Act, and indicate
that the Act was an attempt by Congress to minimize disputes be
tween management and labor that tended to interfere with the flow
of interstate commerce. l3 To this end, Congress stressed that it was
in the best interest of management, unions, and labor to observe
their respective rights and duties as to each other and as to the
health and safety of the general public. 14 Thus, through the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, Congress has sought to protect
and support the free flow of commerce by encouraging mutual co
operation among employers, employees, and labor organizations.1 5
In interpreting section 301 of the Labor Management Rela
tions Act of 1947,16 the United States Supreme Court held that the
federal courts were to create a substantive common law that would
govern the interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining
agreementsP As the Court explained, "[w]e conclude that the sub
10. See supra note 2, and infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
11. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
12.

[d.

13. § 141.
14.

[d.

15. The following Senate report indicates a clear legislative intent to this end:
"Statutory recognition of the collective agreement as a valid, binding, and enforceable
contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote a higher degree of responsibility
upon the parties to such agreements, and will thereby promote industrial peace." S.
REp. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947).
16. § 185.
17. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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stantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which
the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor
laws."18 It is against this backdrop that the federal courts of the
United States must interpret and enforce the terms of collective
bargaining agreements.
B.

Facts of Martinsville Nylon Employees Council, v. NLRB19

E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. ("the Company") oper
ates a plant in Martinsville, Virginia, which is engaged in the manu
facture of nylon yams;20 The Martinsville Nylon Employees
Council Corporation ("the Union") has represented the employees
at the Martinsville facility for over forty years and has been success
ful in negotiating a continuous line of collective bargaining agree
ments with the Company.21 The instant case arose from a collective
bargaining agreement that was to encompass the period from April
7, 1986 to August 31, 1987.22
Id. at 456.
969 F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 563, 565.
Id.
22. Id. The agreement states in pertinent part:
ARTICLE II
RECOGNmON AND SCOPE
Section 1. The UNION is recognized as the exclusive bargaining agency
for the employees at the Plant as set forth in Article I of this Agreement for
the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of work, and other conditions of employment.
Section 2. There shall be no discrimination, coercion, interference, or re
straint by the COMPANY or the UNION or any of their agents against any
employee because of membership or non-membership in the UNION, and the
UNION agrees that there shall be no solicitation or promotional UNION ac
tivity on COMPANY time.
Section 3. The Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement between the
parties hereto as of the execution date hereof. However, any supplement
which may hereafter be mutually agreed upon between the parties when exe
cuted in the same manner as this Agreement shall become and be a part of this
Agreement.
ARTICLE XII
ADJUSTMENT OF GRIEVANCES
Section 1. The UNION agrees to select an employee Committee of no
more than five (5) officials and/or accredited Representatives, including a
Chairperson, who shall constitute the Grievance Committee. The UNION
will keep the Plant Management advised of any changes in the personnel of
this Committee.
Section 2. In the event that a dispute or grievance shall arise between the
COMPANY and the UNION or any employee, an earnest effort shall be made
to settle such dispute or grievance in the following sequence:
FIRST, the aggrieved employee normally will attempt to obtain a settle
18.
19.
20.
21.
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During the effective period of this CBA, the Company notified
the Union that there was a need for heightened efficiency at the
Martinsville facility.23 On February 2, 1987, the Company
presented the Union with a memorandum entitled "Union Officials
and Council Representatives Productivity Proposal" ("the Produc
ment through the members of supervision directly in charge. However, the
aggrieved employee may elect to take the matter up directly with his UNION
Representative who will attempt settlement of the grievance with supervision
directly in charge. The aggrieved employee may be present.
SECOND, between the employee's Union Representative and the Area
supervision of the area in which the grievance occurs. If the UNION Repre
sentative so desires, he [or she] may have the Grievance Committee Chairman
present at this step.
At the FIRST and SECOND Steps, of the grievance procedure an answer
normally will be given to the UNION by supervision not later than ten (10)
calendar days after the date the grievance was presented at each step. In the
event an answer is not given by supervision at a Step, unless an extension of
time is agreed upon by both parties, the grievance may be presented at the
next Step.

THIRD, failing a satisfactory adjustment as above provided, the UNION
Grievance Committee may present the grievance to the Plant Manager and/or
his[/her] designated representatives who will render an answer to the UNION
within ten (10) calendar days of the date the grievance is presented at this
Step, unless an extension of time is agreed upon by the parties.
Any Grievance not presented at the SECOND and THIRD Steps with
[sic] ten (10) calendar days following supervision's answer to the grievance in
the preceding Step shall be considered terminated by the parties unless an
extension of the time is agreed upon by the parties.
Section 3. In the event that more than one (1) employee is involved in a
grievance or dispute in the FIRST Step, the number of employees, exclusive of
the UNION Representative, to confer with supervision shall be agreed upon
between supervision and the UNION.
Section 4. Meetings between elected officials and/or accredited Repre
sentatives of the UNION and the Plant Management will be permitted on
COMPANY time and COMPANY property in cases where such meetings are
for the purpose of conferring with the Plant Management. No elected officials
or Representatives shall be paid for the time consumed in a meeting with the
Plant Management outside of his{lherJ regular working hours. No change in
the working hours of an elected official or Representative will be made for the
purpose of conducting business of the UNION except in cases where a Repre
sentative or elected official may make his{lherJ own arrangements with another
qualified employee, subject to the approval of his{lherJ supervision and pro
vided no overtime pay is incurred.

Section 5. An accredited Representative of the UNION, on being
presented with a grievance shall be allowed a reasonable amount of time dur
ing working hours without loss of pay to receive, investigate and handle such
grievance in accordance with the grievance procedure after obtaining permis
sion from his{iherJ immediate supervision. It is understood that in contacting
an employee concerning the settlement of handling of a grievance, prior advice
of the desire to make the contact will be given to the employee's supervision.
Id. at 567 n.6 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 565.
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tivity Proposal" or "the Proposal").24 The Company noted in this
memorandum that for the past several years union representatives
had enjoyed great freedom to pursue union business on company
time and with pay.25
Day-to-day. practices had developed at the Martinsville facility
that permitted union officials and representatives to spend 60% to
100% of their on-the-job time engaged in various union activities. 26
Common practice had come to allow Union officials and represent
atives to leave their production posts, at their own discretion, to
pursue active employeegrievancesP Union officials and repre
sentatives were also free to spend time in the Union office, located
on the company premises, researching employee grievances; to con
fer with other Union representatives and the represented employ
ees regarding existing or potential infractions of the CBA; and to
walk freely about the plant facility to "police" the terms of the
CBA.28 These Union activities all took place during the representa
tives' scheduled shifts, and the representatives were fully compen
sated by the Company for time spent on Union business.29
Prior to the issuance of the Proposal, the Company made no
complaint concerning the amount of time the Union representatives
were spending away from their formal production duties. 30 In fact,
there were several instances where the Company accommodated
shift changes for Union representatives to facilitate the pursuit of
Union business. 31
At the time that the Company presented the Union with the
Proposal, it informed the Union that it was opening negotiations on
the substantive contents of the Proposa1. 32 In essence, the Produc
24. Id.
25. Id. The Union alleged that its officials and representatives had been pennit
ted to exclusively pursue Union business on company time since January 1965. Id. at
566. The Administrative Law Judge found that the Company relaxed the fonnal super
vision of Union officials and representatives in, or shortly before, 1980. Id. at 567.
26. Id. at 565. Union officials and representatives were employees of E. I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. an(j received their wages from the company. The Union
did not provide these individuals with additional compensation.
27. Id.
28. Martinsville Nylon Employees Council v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1263, 1265 (D.c.
Cir.1992).
29. Id.
30. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 563, 565 (1989).
31. Id.
32. Id. Not only was the substance of the Productivity Proposal a great source of
conflict, but the parties also had great difficulty in simply discussing the proposal. The
Company made almost daily offers to meet with the Union representatives but stipu
lated that no shift changes or accommodations would be made to facilitate the attend
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tivity Proposal stated that the Company would require Union offi
cials and representatives, with the exception of the Union
president, to work their scheduled shifts and to seek the permission
of their immediate supervisors before leaving their posts in the pur
suit of an employee grievance. 33 The Proposal made it clear that
the Company would once again require production work from the
Union officials and representatives. 34 The Company estimated that
requiring Union officials and. representatives to perform production
work would lead to a savings of $400,000 per year. 35
The Union objected to the implementation of the Proposal in
its entirety and maintained that such· a proposal could not be dis
cussed until contract negotiation time. 36 The Company repeatedly
offered opportunities for negotiation, but to no avail. On March 8,
1987, the Company enacted the Proposal and issued a memoran
dum to its supervisors which detailed its implementation. 37
From that date forward, Union officials and representatives
would be required to follow ·the strict language of the collective bar
gaining agreement. 38 In order to obtain permission to pursue a
grievance, the Union representative and her or his immediate su
pervisor were to engage in a prescribed colloquy consisting of five
questions. 39 The memo also established that the supervisor had dis
cretion to permit the pursuit of a grievance as the employee's work
load allowed. 40 Finally, the supervisor of that Union representative
was to contact the supervisor of the grievant to set up a mutually
ance of any Union representative. This position meant that any Union representative
who was not on the day shift would not be paid to attend a meeting between 8:00 a.m.
and 4:00 p.m. Those Union representatives who attended the meetings and who were
day shift employees would draw their normal wages. The Union then established the
position that any further meetings between Company and Union officials must take
place after 4:30 p.m. and on neutral territory. [d. at 566.
33. [d. at 565-66.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

[d.
[d. at 566.
[d.
[d.
See supra note 22 at Art. XII, § 5.
E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. at 566. The five questions were

as follows:
1. Who is the grievant or employee with whom you want to meet?
2. What area of the plant does he/she work?
3. Who is the employee's supervisor or contact supervisor?
4. What is the nature of the grievance?
5. How much time do you think you will need?
[d.
40.

[d.
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Case History of Martinsville Nylon Employees Council v.
NLRB42

The complaints filed by the Union alleged that the Company
had violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), (5), and 8(d) of the National La
bor Relations Act ("NLRA").43 Essentially, the Union claimed
that the Company had unilaterally altered the working conditions
at the Martinsville facility without providing an opportunity to bar
gain or negotiate and that such behavior constituted an unfair labor
practice for the purposes of the NLRA.44
The Administrative Law Judge ("AU") held that the Com
pany did not attempt to modify the CBA, but simply returned to a
strict interpretation of its terms: 45

[T]he deviation from contractual provisions or the relaxation of
rules contained therein did not amount to a waiver of Respon
dent's rights under the contract or to the establishment of a past
practice; and that when, on 8 March, the Respondent, for purely
economic reasons, returned to a literal interpretation of the con
tract and strict enforcement of its rights thereunder, it did not
thereby refuse to bargain in good faith, in violation of the Act.46

On May 17, 1988, the AU dismissed the Union's complaint in its
entirety.47
Following the decision of the AU, the Union filed exceptions
and supporting briefs with the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "the Board"). The Board agreed with the AU that
the Company had not violated sections of the NLRA "when it of
fered to bargain over changes in the practices and when its own
bargaining position was essentially to return to the written terms of
the agreement. "48
The Board, however, drew a distinction between returning to
the express terms of the CBA on the one hand and implementing a
restriction that was (1) not contained in the CBA and (2) which was
Id..
969·F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1265.
44. E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. at 565.
45. Id. at 567.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 571.
48. Id. at 563.
41.

42.
43.
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contrary to past practice on the other. The NLRB held that the
CBA contained no language that gave rise to question four4 9 of the
Company's prescribed colloquy, which asked, "What is the nature
of the grievance?"50 The Board reasoned that requiring a Union
representative to answer this question before allowing that repre
sentative to pursue an employee grievance was a unilateral mid
term modification of the CBA and as such, amounted to a violation
of section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act. 51 The NLRB
required the Company to remove question four from its Productiv
ity Proposal and then dismissed the remainder of the Union's com
plaint. 52 The Union alone sought appeal in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 53
D.

The Majority Opinion in Martinsville Nylon Employees
Council v. NLRB54

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum
bia framed its analysis of the issues in three parts. In Part A, the
court discussed the ramifications of the no-oral-modification
(NOM) clause contained within the collective bargaining agree
ment. 55 In Part B, the court reasoned that the NOM clause could
be combined with the merger clause56 of the CBA to form a "zip
per" clause. 57 The court then held that the zipper clause proscribed
49. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
50. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. at 563-64 & n.3. The Board
noted that questions 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the five questions promulgated by the Company
could all be "fairly implied from the contract terms." [d. at 564. However, the Board
went on to hold that "[t]he contract terms do not ... clearly imply that the Respondent
was free to learn in advance 'the nature of the grievance.'" [d. (quoting question 4 of
the CBA).
51. [d. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1988».
52. Martinsville Nylon Employees Council v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1263, 1266 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
53.

[d.

54. 969 F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
55. [d. at 1267. The NOM clause provided that" 'any supplement which may
hereafter be mutually agreed upon between the parties when executed in the same man
ner as this Agreement shall become and be part of this Agreement.'" Id. at 1265 (quot
ing E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 563, 567 n.6 (1989» (emphasis
added). See also supra note 22 for the pertinent text of the collective bargaining .
agreement.
56. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268. The merger clause provided that" '[t]his
[CBA] constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties hereto as of the execution
date hereof.'" [d. at 1265 (quoting E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. at
567 n.6) (emphasis added). See also supra note 22 for the pertinent text of the collec
tive bargaining agreement.
57. [d. at 1265 ("[T]he AU relied upon ... Article II § 3, the so-called 'zipper'
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the inclusion of any past practice within the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.58 Finally, in Part C, the Martinsville court
reasoned that "past practice may still inform the Board's under
standing of what the written agreement means."59
1.

Part A - Treatment of NOM Clauses Under the Uniform
Commercial Code

The majority, in an opinion written by Judge Ginsburg, began
its analysis with the Union's argument that, under existing common
law, a no-oral-modification clause is essentially unenforceable.60
While agreeing with this contention, the court then explained that
this traditional common law rule has been discarded in many areas
of the law.61 Specifically, the court pointed to Article 2 of the UCC,
which has been adopted in every state to govern the creation and
enforcement of contracts for the sale of goods.62 Section 2-209(2)
of the UCC provides that "[a] signed agreement which excludes
modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be
otherwise modified or rescinded."63 Thus, a NOM clause is en
forceable under Article 2 of the UCc.64
After outlining these two strong positions in contract law, the
majority explicitly stated its preference for the UCC treatment of
NOM clauses. 65 Judge Ginsburg likened the parties to a CBA to
"'merchants' within the meaning of UCC 2-104" in that they pos
sess knowledge of the terms under negotiation and are represented
by counsel when the negotiations take place. 66 The court further
reasoned that a strong profit motive on both sides of the table en
sured that no one would miss "the fine print" or include a "mean
ingless provision against oral modifications. "67
Judge Ginsburg found that the UCC view enabled sophisti
cated parties to consciously include or exclude an enforceable no
oral-modification provision and, in essence, control their own
clause, consisting of both an 'entire agreement' provision and" a 'no-oral-modification'
provision. ").
58. Id. at 1268.
59. Id. at 1269.
60. [d. at 1267.
61. [d.
62. Id.
63. [d. (quoting V.C.c. § 2-209(2) (1990».
64. V.C.c. § 2-209(2) (1990).
65. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1267.
66. [d. (citing V.C.C. § 2-104 (1990».
67. Id.
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destiny.68 The common law view, on the other hand, simply renders
such a provision unenforceable. The court reasoned that the tradi
tional common law view robbed parties of the ability to restrict the
manner in which future modifications to the CBA were to be
made. 69
The majority then addressed the question of whether national
labor policy prohibited the enforcement of NOM clauses. 7o The
court noted that in Certified Corp. v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied
Workers, Local 996,71 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
adopted the common law stance against NOM clauses, explaining
that such a prohibition would encourage parties to a CBA to re
solve a dispute through further negotiations rather than coercion or
strike.72 The Martinsville court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that "overriding a no-oral-modification clause in a CBA
'effectuates the federal policy of maintaining 'industrial peace."'73
Judge Ginsburg concluded that the position taken in Certified
Corp. would actually lead to "industrial strife."74 The court rea
soned that the clear intent of the parties when they included a
NOM clause could not be ignored. 75 To do so would cause uncer
tainty as to which terms of the CBA would be enforced, as well as
bickering among the parties over "who said what to whom."76
The majority embraced the concepts of self-determination and
certainty in contract formation as embodied in .the VCC view of
NOM clauses. 77 As Judge Ginsburg stated, "we are confident that
the VCC rule will better serve the purposes of collective bargaining
and of industrial peace. "78 It should be noted, however, that the
court refused to base its holding upon this reasoning. Indeed, the
court began part B of its opinion by explicitly stating that it had not
made a final determination between the traditional common law
view and the VCC view of the NOM clause. 79
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 1267-68.
597 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979).
Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268.
[d. at 1268 (quoting Certified Corp., 597 F.2d at 1271).
[d.
[d. at 1267.
[d. at 1268.
[d.
[d. at 1268.
[d.
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2. Part B - Combination of a NOM Clause and a Merger
Clause Forms an Impenetrable Zipper Clause
The zipper clause contained in Article II of the collective bar
gaining agreement proved determinative.80 Judge Ginsburg con
cluded that the additional inclusion of the "entire agreement" or
merger clause in the CBA left no doubt as to the intentions of the
parties.81 The court held that the combination of the NOM clause
and the merger clause formed an impenetrable zipper clause that
did not permit the incorporation of any past practice into the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement. 82 The court made clear that
no past practice, either consistent or inconsistent with the explicit
terms of the CBA, was to be incorporated.83
In reaching this conclusion, the majority took issue with the
distinction made by the NLRB between past practices that were
consistent with the terms of the CBA and those that were not. The
Board held that the entire agreement clause served to bar the incor
poration of any past practice that was inconsistent with the express
terms of the CBA.84 Judge Ginsburg took the NLRB's explanation
to imply that the merger clause did not serve to bar the incorpora
tion of any past practices that were "not inconsistent"85 with the
express terms of the CBA.86 The majority emphatically rejected
this implicit proposition, holding it to be "flatly inconsistent with
the entire agreement clause."87 The court reasoned that the entire
agreement clause states that the totality of the agreement between
80. See supra note 22 for the pertinent text of the collective bargaining
agreement.
81. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268. Judge Ginsburg emphasized that the written
CBA was closed to any alteration that did not come in written form:
[B]y including the entire agreement clause the parties here made clear beyond
doubt their intention not to be bound to any informal arrangement to which
they might voluntarily adhere during the term of their CBA. In effect, each
told the other: "If you want anything else, you'll have to get it in writing," and
to this they both agreed.
Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 563,563 (1989).
85. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268. The court explained its use of a double nega
tive by stating that "[the NLRB's] clear implication is that a practice not inconsistent
with the CBA (Le., it adds to rather than alters it) is incorporated into the CBA." Id.
It appears that holding a practice to be consistent with the written terms of a con
tract and holding a practice to be not inconsistent with the written terms of a contract
carry different meanings for the purpose of the court's analysis.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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the parties is embodied in the written terms of the CBA.88 The
majority found that the entire agreement clause in conjunction with
the NOM clause revealed the clear intent of the parties.89 No addi
tion or alteration of this CBA was to be made in the absence of a
further writing.
Part C - Course of Performance Plays a Limited Role in
the Face of a Zipper Clause

3.

Finally, the majority explained that, while the past practices of
the parties were not to be incorporated within the express terms of
the CBA, the past practices of the parties could be used to inform
the court as to what the terms of the CBA actually meant.90 In
interpreting the language of the CBA, the court reasoned that "the
parties' course of performance may be the best evidence of their
intent in using a particular term."91 The court found support for
this premise in both case law92 and section 2-208 of the UCC.93
The majority opinion explained that the decisions of the Ad
ministrative Law Judge and the National Labor Relations Board
were based upon the belief that the entire substance of the agree
ment between the Company and the Union could be gleaned from
the terms of the CBA alone. 94 In the words of the court, "[b]oth
[the AU and the Board] seem to have assumed that the meaning of
the contract is to be discerned entirely from within its four cor
ners."95 Judge Ginsburg opined that this was "particularly unfortu
nate ... where the past practice predated the current contract."96
In essence, the court proposed that the current contract may have
been an attempt by the parties to memorialize what had come to be
the day-to-day practices at the plant. 97 As the court illustrated:
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 1268-69.
at 1268.
at 1269.
(citing Carey Canada, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 940 F.2d 1548 (D.C.

Cir. 1991)).
93. [d. (citing V.C.C. § 2-208). Section 2-208(1) provides that "any course of
perfonnance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to detennine
the meaning of the agreement." V.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1990).
Section 2-208(2) provides further that "[t]he express tenns of the agreement and
any such course of perfonnance ... shall be construed whenever reasonable as consis
tent with each other." V.C.C. § 2-208(2) (1990).
94. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1269.
95. [d.
96.
97.

[d.
[d. at 1270.
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For example, Article XII, § 5, provides that a union representa
tive may process a grievance during working hours "after ob
taining permission from his immediate supervision." Since the
Employer had not since 1980 required a union representative to
get permission each time before handling a grievance, could not
§ 5 refer to the apparently blanket permission that union repre
sentatives had been given in practice?98

The majority found error in the prior proceedings because no
attempt was made to compare the terms of the CBA with the ongo
ing practices of the parties to determine if such a memorialization
was intended.99 The court remanded the case to the National La
bor Relations Board "to consider the relevance of past practice to
the meaning of the contract as written."loo
E.

The Dissent in Martinsville Nylon Employees Council v.
NLRBlOl

In her dissenting opinion, Judge Wald registered two major
complaints with the opinion of the majority. The greater portion of
Judge Wald's dissent chastised the majority for its "dicta" in Part A
of its opinion.lo2 The dissent reasoned that strict enforcement of
NOM clauses within collective bargaining agreements was both ill
conceived and unsupported.103 Judge Wald argued that, while it is
the place of the federal judiciary to create the federal common law
of collective bargaining agreements, such development must take
place in accordance with the policies of national labor law. 104 The
dissent opined that a federal court may not rely upon the principles
of commercial law as embodied in the VCC while fashioning a set
of rules to govern the interpretation and enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements. lOS
The dissent then questioned the majority's treatment of the
holding in Certified Corp. v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers,
Loca1996. 106 Judge Wald explained that the flexibility sought to be
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 1269-70.
100. Id. at 1270.
101. Id. at 1270 (Weld, J., dissenting.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1270-72.
104. Id. at 1270 (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456
57 (1957».
105. Id.
106. 597 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979).
Judge Wald stated, "I believe Certified Corp. may ~ave more to offer than my
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achieved in Certified Corp. appears to promote a smooth and coop
erative relationship between management and labor.107 The judge
reasoned that such a relationship was obviously "an incontrovert
ible goal of federal labor policies. "108
The dissent stressed the unique nature of the collective bar
gaining relationship and the fundamental role of federal labor pol
icy in forming the federal common· law of collective bargaining
agreements. It explained that the "'unforeseeable contingen
cies"'109 that occur every day within the management/labor rela
tionship must be met with flexibility in order to achieve the goals of
national labor policy.1 10 Rigid structure and certainty would prove
to be costly and disruptive in the arena of labor negotiations. 111
Judge Wald's second major disagreement with the majority
concerned the distinction which the majority drew between the use
of course of performance to create new contract terms and its use as
a tool in contract interpretation. 112 Judge Wald reasoned that "the
line between interpreting contract language in light of past practices
and saying that established practices, when consistent with contract
language, will be deemed covered by the contract is a theoretical
one at best. I can only wonder how distinctly it can be applied in
practice. "113
II.

ANALYSIS

The majority in Martinsville held that the combination of the
merger clause and the NOM clause within the CBA proved disposi
tive. 114 First, the court reasoned that the merger clause barred the
incorporation of any implicit arrangement within the agreement: on
the date of execution the written CBA stood as the totality of the
agreement between the parties. 115 Second, the NOM clause procolleagues grant." Maninsville, 969 F.2d at 1271 (Wald, J., dissenting). See supra notes
70-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the majority's treatment of Cenified
Corp.

107. Maninsville, 969 F.2d at 1271.
108. [d. (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967».
109. [d. (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 353-544 (1964) (Goldberg,

J., concurring».
110. [d.
111. [d.
112. [d. at 1272.
113. [d.
114. [d. at 1268.
115. [d.
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vided that any alteration must come in the form of a writing.116 In
the face of a zipper clause, any practice that was not embodied in
the CBA or in a subsequent written modification had no legal
effect.117
The Union argued that the parties' course of performance over
the past several years affected a modification of their agreement
and had come to allow enhanced freedoms for Union representa
tives.11 8 The Martinsville court rejected the Union's argument and
held that the CBA was limited to its explicit written terms. On
April 7, 1986, the CBA in question became the entire agreement
between the parties. Any practice that was not contained in that
writing was not a part of the agreement.1 19 After April 7, no prac
tice could be said to modify the CBA unless memorialized by a
writing. As the majority explained:
[T]he parties here made clear beyond doubt their intention not to
be bound to any infomlal arrangement to which they might vol
untarily adhere during the term of their CBA. In effect, each
told the other: "If you want anything else, you'll have to get it in
writing," and to this both agreed. 120

In essence, the court reasoned that industrial turmoil would result if
parties were unsure which portions of their CBA would be
enforced. 121
The Martinsville court explained that 'although past practices
could not be incorporated into the CBA, such practices might in
form the court as to the parties' intended meaning of the written
terms. 122 The Martinsville court then remanded the case to the
NLRB to determine if the contested practice was simply an imple
mentation of the written terms of the CBA. Notwithstanding the
court's instructions on remand, it appears that the behavior of
Union representatives may have actually contradicted the explicit
116. Id. at 1269.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1265.
119. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 563, 563 (1989).
120. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268.
121. Id. The court was strenuous in its advocacy on this point:
We think it more likely that judicial disregard for the parties' expressed intent
that any modification be in writing is more likely to promote industrial strife
by encouraging prevarication about who said what to whom, and to create
uncertainty about what a court will determine are the actual obligations of the
parties.
Id.
122.

Id. at 1269.
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terms of the CBA. Union representatives moved about the plant
and engaged in Union business at their own discretion. This prac
tice was not explicitly authorized by either the primary CBA or any
subsequent memorandum of modification. In fact, one could argue
that such behavior actually contradicted the CBA requirement of
supervisory permission. 123
The Martinsville court reached the correct result in affirming
the NLRB's dismissal of the Union's complaint. However, the rea
soning supporting this conclusion seems strained, primarily because
of the court's reliance on the zipper clause. Enforcement of a zip
per clause within a CBA presents at least two major problems.
First, it appears that such a clause could prove overly-restrictive in
the context of industrial labor relations. It is difficult' to imagine a
collective bargaining agreement that could even begin to set out the
procedures, rights, and duties involved in every possible contin
gency.124 Second, the court's reliance 'on the zipper clause includes
an implicit reliance upon the widely criticized NOM clause.
As stressed in the Martinsville dissent, the need for flexibility
within the collective bargaining relationship cannot be overstated.
Judge Wald argued that "[t]here are too many unforeseeable con
tingencies in a collective bargaining relationship to justify making
the words of the contract the exclusive source of rights. and
duties."125
123. The seemingly applicable section of the written CBA states as follows:
Section 5. An accredited Representative of the UNION, on being
presented with a grievance shall be allowed a reasonable amount of time dur
ing working hours without loss of pay to receive, investigate and handle such
grievance in accordance with the grievance procedure after obtaining permis
sion from his immediate supervision. It is understood that in contacting an
employee concerning the settlement of handling of a grievance, prior advice of
the desire to make the contact will be given to the employee's supervision.
E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B. at 567 n.6 (emphasis added).
124. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
125. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1271 (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 353-54 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring». See also HARRY SHUL
MAN & NEIL w. CHAMBERLAIN, CASES ON LABOR RELATIONS 3 (1949).
[C]ollective bargaining involves first, the negotiation of a general agreement
as to terms and conditions of employment, and second, the maintenance of the
parties' relations for the period of the agreement. The first process is the dra
matic one which catches the public eye and which is sometimes mistaken to be
the entire function of collective bargaining. But in fact, it is to labor relations
approximately what the wedding is to domestic relations. It launches the par
ties on their joint enterprise with good wishes and good intentions. The life of
the enterprise then depends on continuous, daily cooperation and adjustment.

[d.
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Due to the inherent dynamics of the collective bargaining rela
tionship, the potential for necessary alterations and modifications is
infinite. 126 Within this context, the operation of an industrial pro
duction facility under an enforceable zipper clause would prove
both time consuming and expensive.
Further, in relying upon the zipper clause, the court based at
least a portion of its holding upon the enforceability of NOM
clauses, notwithstanding the fact that courts have universally held
that such clauses are not enforceable at common law.1 27 As Judge
Cardozo stated in 1919, "[t]hose who make a contract may unmake
it. The clause which forbids a change may be chang~d like any
other. "128
In the face of opposition to the enforceability of NOM clauses,
the Martinsville majority drew an analogy to contracts for the sale
of goods. 129 Article 2 of the VCC provides that NOM clauses in
contracts for the sale of goods are enforceable under certain cir
cumstances. 130 The court reasoned that the unique context of col
lective bargaining would be well-served by a similar rule. 131
The common law and the VCC are in direct opposition132 and
such contlict of authorities indicates that the enforceability of a
NOM clause must be questioned. Close scrutiny, however, reveals
126.

Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1271 (Wald, J., dissenting).
Unanticipated amendments may, for example, be necessary in the context
of a bid with a time deadline, or in other constraining situations where flexible
procedures will make the difference between failure and success for both labor
and management. Requiring that all such impromptu modifications be memo
rialized in writing (with attendant costs in time, effort, and money), may be
counterproductive to the best interests of both sides.
Id.
127. Commercial Contractors, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Quar. Co., 524
F.2d 944, 952 (5th Cir. 1975); Teer v. George A. Fuller Co., 30 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir.
1929); Eastline Corp. v. Marion Apartments Ltd., 524 So. 2d 582, 584 (Miss. 1988);
ABC Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Dolhun's Marine, Inc., 157 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Wis.
1968).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 283 cmt. band 148 cmt. b.
(1979).
128. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 381 (N.Y. 1919).
129. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1267-68.
130. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1990).
131. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268.
132. Alysse Kaplan, Note, Partial Satisfaction Under the uee, 61 FORDHAM L.
REv. 221, 237-38 (1992). "Under common-law principles for modification of an agree
ment, both parties must offer consideration. Under the uce, however, this has
changed to reflect the Code's emphasis on flexibility and the facilitation of commercial
transactions. UCC § 2-209(1) specifies that no consideration is necessary to modify a
contract." Id. (footnote omitted).
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that the similarities between contracts for the sale of goods and col
lective bargaining agreements warrant the application of VCC prin
ciples to the federal common law of collective bargaining.
Regrettably, the Martinsville majority failed to fully evaluate the
application of commercial law within the unique context of collec
tive bargaining.
A.

Zipper Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements Should
Not Be Strictly Enforced

Courts and commentators alike have suggested that no writing
could ever embody the "entire agreement" between a company, a
union, and the individual employees.133 At best, the boilerplate
language of a merger clause within a CBA provides the parties with
an unrealistic and misleading sense of completion. At worst, a
merger clause provides courts with the temptation to indulge in a
legal fiction. l34 The addition of a NOM clause further binds the
hands of the parties to a CBA and unduly burdens the daily opera
tion of an industrial production facility.
The Martinsville court based its holding upon the zipper clause
found in the parties' CBA.135 The court held that the written terms
133. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142,
154-55 (1969) ("It would be virtually impossible to include all working conditions in a
collective-bargaining agreement."); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 353-54 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) ("There are too many unforeseeable contingencies in a col
lective bargaining relationship to justify making the words of the contract the exclusive
source of rights and duties."); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (A CBA "is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to
govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate."); Railway
Labor Executives Ass'n v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 833 F.2d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 1987)
("A written agreement, however, does not necessarily contain all relevant working con
ditions.... The parties' collective agreement, therefore, includes both the specific terms
set forth in the written agreement and any well established practices that constitute a
'course of dealing' between the [employer] and employees.") (citations omitted).
ARCHIBALD Cox, LAW AND TIiE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 79 (Greenwood Press
1983) (1960) ("A collective agreement rarely expresses all the rights and duties falling
within its scope. One cannot spell out every detail of life in an industrial establishment,
or even that portion which both management and labor regard as matters of mutual
concern."); see also Summers, supra note 1, at 529 ("Because of the diverse congeries of
matters covered by a collective agreement and the practical need for a readable and
reasonably concise document, a written agreement cannot possibly provide for the myr
iad of variant situations which might arise, even if they could be foreseen.").
134. Merk v. Jewel Food Stores, 945 F.2d 889, 902 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 914 (1992). "Manville said that 'national labor
policy' forbids labor and management to have a fully integrated contract no matter how
strongly they prefer the benefits of certainty." Id. (citing Manville Forest Prod., Inc. v.
Paperworkers Union, 831 F.2d 72, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1987».
135. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1268.
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of the CBA embodied the totality of the agreement between the
Company, the Union, and the employees. However, this conclusion
appears unrealistic in that the day-to-day operations of a produc
tion facility present new and unique situations almost constantly.D6
Following the majority's reasoning, an enforceable zipper
clause will lead to costly and time consuming results, for each new
situation will be met with calls to the parties' respective attorneys.
Negotiations and deliberations will be followed by memorialization
of the new terms of the agreement, and then everyone may go back
to work.
The costs and delays involved in following such a procedure do
not comport with the efficient operation of a business. Economic
reality dictates that business-people allow themselves the freedom
to act quickly in a dynamic market.1 37 It seems counterintuitive
that players in the industrial production realm would bind them
selves to a written agreement, oruy to engage in the delusion that
they had provided for all future events.
Because of the dynamic character of the collective bargaining
relationship, the parties to a CBA should be dissuaded from bur
dening themselves with a zipper clause. Although parties do retain
the ability to alter their agreement, such alterations must come in
written form.138 Under the circumstances, even this restriction ap
pears to present an unbearable hindrance. The better-reasoned ap
proach would be to put all parties involved in collective bargaining
on notice that there is no such thing as a fully integrated CBA.139
In essence, the parties to a CBA should be counseled to expect the
136. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained the vital importance of
flexibility under a CBA as follows:
A collective bargaining contract operates prospectively over a substantial pe
riod of time and the parties cannot be expected to foresee all the problems
that will develop in an industrial establishment within the period of the con
tract and more scope must be left for decisions made in the course of perform
ing the agreement. The parties to the collective bargaining agreement share a
degree of mutual interdependence for the cost of disagreement is great and
the pressure to reach agreement is so intense that the parties are willing to
contract with the thought in mind of working out the problems of interpreting
and amending when the inevitable problems arise.
Watson v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 399 F.2d 875,879 (5th Cir. 1968) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
137. See supra note 126.
138. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1269.
139. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. See also Anthony Carabba,
Comment, Merk v. Jewel Food Stores: The Parol Evidence Rule Applied to Collective
Bargaining Agreements - A Trend Toward More Formality in the Name of National La
bor Policy?, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 719 (1993).

1995]

BETWEEN THE OBVIOUS AND THE FOOLISH

357

unexpected and to build a degree of flexibility into their written
agreements.
In the absence of an ironclad zipper clause, alternative mecha
nisms must be established to protect the parties' freedom to con
tract, while at the same time allowing for the flexibility required by
economic reality. The federal common law of collective bargaining
agreements should be developed to give fuller effect to parties'
course of performance. Concurrently, barriers to fraud, extortion,
and false allegations must be constructed to ensure that no course
of performance is enforced as a modification unless it was genuinely
intended as such.
The interworkings of Article 2 of the UCC provide just such a
compromise. Section 2-209 of the UCC fosters flexibility in the
modification of contracts for the sale of goods. At the same time,
however, section 2-209 erects barriers to overreaching and misrep
resentation.1 40 The compromise embodied in section 2-209 is an at
tempt to embrace commercial reality and formulate a set of
workable rules within that context. An application of this very
compromise could prove quite successful within the context of col
lective bargaining.
B. A Comparison of Contracts for the Sale of Goods and
Collective Bargaining Agreements
1. A Useful Analogy May Be Drawn
At first glance, the differences between contracts for the sale of
goods and CBAs seem glaringly apparent. A typical contract for
the sale of goods involves a defined quantity, a specified price, and
a designated date of completion.141 In contrast, the terms of a col
140. 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE SERIES § 2-209:01
at 202-03 (1992).
Section 2-209 has three main objectives. First, in accordance with the
Code's policy of preserving flexibility of commercial contracts, it validates
modifications of sales contracts that are made in good faith, even though those
modifications are not supported by consideration. Second, it invalidates modi
fications that are made in bad faith, even though such modifications are sup
ported by consideration. Finally, the section offers protection against the
possibility that one party to the contract will fraudulently or mistakenly assert
that an oral modification has been made, when, in fact, it has not.
Id. at 203 (footnotes omitted).
141. Merk v. Jewel Food Stores, 945 F.2d 889, 901 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting), cen. denied, 504 U.S. 914 (1992).
It is perverse to say that the contracting process in labor must be more
formal than the contracting process in shipping or construction or natural re
sources. You can define how much coal to sell and where to deliver it ....
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lective bargaining agreement provide for the future conduct and in
teraction of many people, and "[m]any provisions do little but
establish the framework for further bargaining."142 Under these
definitions, it appears that no productive analogy may be drawn be
tween contracts for the sale of goods and collective bargaining
agreements.
The difficulty here, however, lies in our conception of a typical
contract for the sale of goods. As commercial dealings evolve, the
parties to a sale of goods become more sophisticated and the terms
of the bargain become more complex. The expansion and speciali
zation of industry have given rise to sales contracts which extend far
into the future and anticipate a variety of circumstances. The law of
sales has evolved to correspond with commercial reality, growing
beyond a limited application to the "one shot" contract for the sale
of goods. 143 Article 2 of the vee "applies to transactions in
goods,"l44 and draws no distinction between our typical image of
Labor agreements govern the ongoing relations among thousands of persons
and affect matters not so easy to specify. Rigidity backfires. Competitive con
ditions and technology change, Labor relations must change too ....
Id. (second emphasis added).
See also Cox, supra note 133, at 78 (1960) ("Not all commercial contracts, but surely
those which are most familiar, relate to a single transaction.").
142. Archibald Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601, 606
(1956). See also Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp.~ 993 F.2d 603, 618 (7th Cir.) (Easter
brook, J., dissenting) ("Unlike one-shot contracts for the sale of goods, labor agree
ments endure and evolve"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
See SHULMAN & CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 125, at 3.
[T]he heart of ~he collective agreement-indeed, of collective bargaining-is
the process for· continuous joint consideration and adjustment of plant
problems. And it is this feature which indicates the great difference between
the collective labor agreement and commercial contracts generally. The latter
are concerned primarily with "end results"; [sic] the former, with continuous
process.
Id.
143. Zipporah. B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the
Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987).
In nineteenth-century commerce, the prototypical sales transaction was the
face-to-face sale in which the buyer paid cash and took her goods home.
Llewellyn sought, instead, a model that reflected the reality of a twentieth
century "nationwide indirect marketing structure." In the modem world of
sales, Llewellyn's and ours, most commercial sellers and buyers of goods do
not deal face-tO-face and do not immediately take the goods home. Rather,
they contract for a sale in the future; their agreement is usually on the buyer's
or the seller's printed form; their sale is on credit; and their relationship has
just begun.
Id. at 475-76.
144. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990).

1995]

BETWEEN THE OBVIOUS AND THE FOOLISH

359

one shot contracts for the sale of goods on the one hand and long
term contracts for the sale of goods on the other.
Like collective bargaining agreements, long-term contracts for
the sale of goods are made in an attempt to secure a commercial
relationship of extended duration. 145 One prevalent example of a
long-term contract for the sale of goods occurs in the natural gas
industry.146 'JYpically, a local natural gas distributor agrees to buy
all of its requirements from a single supplier for a period of several
years. 147 In this situation, the local distributor will forego the op
portunity to buy gas at the lowest price available at any given time.
However, in return, the distributor will be guaranteed an adequate
supply of gas in the coming years. l48
A similar situation exists in the realm of collective bargaining.
The employer enters into an exclusive relationship with a labor
union and foregoes the opportunity to hire non-union labor at re
duced compensation. In return, the employer receives certainty of
an adequate supply of qualified and productive labor. In both long
term contracts for the sale of goods and collective bargaining agree
ments there exists an attempt to foster an on-going contractual rela
tionship. Notwithstanding the typical one-shot contract for the sale
of goods, a genuine analogy may be drawn between long-term con
tracts for the sale of goods under the VCC and collective bargain
ing agreements.
2.

Flexibility of Contracts for the Sale of Goods and
Collective Bargaining Agreements

A comparison of long-term contracts for the sale of goods and
145. Koch Hydrocarbon Co. v. MOU Resources Group, Inc., 988 F.2d 1529 (8th
Cir. 1993). The court, quoting one commentator, explained the important role of such
agreements: "Without the supply and market security provided by long-term contracts,
investment in the large capital assets associated with the production, transportation,
and consumption of gas would be substantially retarded." Id. at 1533 n.5 (quoting
Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural
Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REv. 345, 354 (1983».
146. Transcontinental Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 424
(1986) ("long-term contracts are the norm" within the natural gas industry).
Additionally, several courts of appeals have explicitly held that the uec applies to
contracts for the sale of natural gas. Koch, 988 F.2d at 1534; Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado
Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 687 (10th Cir. 1991); American Exploration Co. v.
Columbia Gas 1Tansmission Corp., 779 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1985).
147. Koch, 988 F.2d at 1533 ("[P]ipelines, including MOU, contracted with sellers
such as Koch ... in order to ensure a reliable supply of natural gas. These agreements
invariably were long-term contracts ....").
148. Id.
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collective bargaining agreements reveals a common theme of flexi
bility. The parties to aCBA seek to maintain a productive and co
operative relationship with indefinite breadth,149 Likewise, Article
2 offers a flexible framework to buyers and sellers of goods based in
the reality of modern commercial transactions.
Modification of a contract for the sale of goods provides an
excellent example of the Code's implicit flexibility. In view of the
realities of commercial transactions, section 2-209(1) of the VCC
removed the requirement of consideration150 in modifying a con
tract for the sale of goodS. 15 ! The framers of Article 2 recognized
that a degree of flexibility was essential, and that the day-to-day
realities of transactions in goods required a departure from the
traditional common law view of consideration. 152 The comment fol
lowing section 2-209 explains that "[t]his section seeks to protect
149. See SHULMAN & CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 125, at 3. See also United Steel
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring) (a
collective bargaining agreement is "the charter instrument of a system of industrial self
government").
150. Of course, one of the fundamental precepts of contract law is that considera
tion is required for the formation of an enforceable contract as well as any subsequent
modification or agreement. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACJ'S
185-87 (3d ed. 1987). See also United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., Inc., 905
F.2d 1117,1121 (7th Cir. 199O); Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781
F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1986).
151. U.C.C. § 2-209, cmt. 1 (1990) ("This section seeks to protect and make effec
tive all necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the
technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments."). See also, 1 THOMAS M.
QUINN, QUINN'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CoMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST'll 2
209 [A)[I] (2d ed. 1991).
Modification of a sales contract is a common event. Indeed, multiple modifi
cations of the same contract are not uncommon. Change is a fact of life. Less
common but no less important is rescission of the contract. That, too, is often
a fact of commercial life. Section 2-209 assumes the validity of both such
events and seeks to facilitate the process.
Id.
152. 2 HAWKLAND, supra note 140, § 2-209:02 at 203 (1992). As Professor Hawk
land explained, "[s]ection 2-209 has three main objectives. First, in accordance with the
Code's policy of preserving flexibility of commercial contracts, it validates modifica
tions of sales contracts that are made in good faith, even though those modifications are
not supported by consideration." Id.
See also, Robert A. Hillman, Standards for Revising Article 2 of the V.e.e.: The
NOM Clause Model, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1509 (1994). Professor Hillman opined:
. Through the use of standards such as commercial reasonableness, unconscio
nability, and good faith, Article 2 in large measure appears to have accom
plished Karl Llewellyn's goal of drafting sales law that reflects societal
customs and traditions and adjusts to evolving commercial practices, but still
provides a framework of rules to govern commercial relationships.
Id. at 1515 (citations omitted).
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and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of
sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which at present
hamper such adjustments."lS3
In both collective bargaining and the sale of goods, agreements
are continuously altered without a quid pro quo exchange of con
sideration on every point. Pursuant to section 2-209, parties to a
sale of goods may adjust the terms of their agreement for their own
mutual benefit, without considering whether they have satisfied the
formalistic requirement of consideration. Analogously, considera
tion plays a unique and reduced role in the common law of collec
tive bargaining agreements. At least two Vnited States Courts of
Appeals have held that consideration is not required to render a
CBA enforceable. l54 In both contexts, the law has sought to sup
port .economic reality instead of forcing rigid contract doctrine
upon an incompatible situation.
Consider the following example. A and B are parties to an
agreement. B asks A for a modification that will bring no addi
tional costs or inconvenience to A. A agrees to the modification,
but B offers no additional consideration to support her side of the
bargain. The law seeks to support the everyday realities of business
by enforcing such modifications even in the absence of fresh consid
eration. This example could apply to a sale of goods where the
buyer asks the seller to deliver the specified goods three days ear
lier than agreed, or to a situation where the union requests that an
employee's daily coffee break be moved from 9:00 a.m. to 9:30 a.m.
In view of the similarities that exist between contracts for the
sale of goods and collective bargaining agreements, the Martinsville
court was justified in relying upon the provisions of Article 2. The
problem with the majority opinion is that it did not go far enough.
The Martinsville court advocated the enforcement of NOM clauses
within CBAs by arguing that the VCC holds such clauses enforcea
ble. 1ss However, the provision for the enforceability of NOM
clauses is not a per se rule under the VCC. A better reasoned re
sult could have been obtained if the Martinsville majority had em
braced the subtleties of section 2-209 and applied them to the
special challenges presented by collective bargaining.
153. V.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. l.
154. Certified Corp. v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers, Local 996, 597 F.2d
1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1979); Darnel v. East, 573 F.2d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 1978).
155. Martinsville Nylon Employees Council v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1263, 1268 (D.C.
Cir.1992).
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The Limited Role of No-Oral-Modification Clauses Within the
Uniform Commercial Code

An exchange of consideration between two parties often oper
ates as evidence of an agreement between those parties.1 56 When
the vee dispensed with the requirement of consideration in modi
fying a contract for the sale of goods, an effective safeguard against
fabrication was IOSt. 157 Freed from the requirement of considera
tion, parties could accuse each other of breach of some alleged
modification, and the court would then be faced with little more
than a swearing match. To avoid this difficult problem, section 2
209 of the vee provides for the enforceability of NOM clauses
within contracts for the sale of goodS. 15S The parties to a contract
for the sale of goods, by inserting a NOM clause into their agree
ment, may prevent the enforcement of a completely fabricated
modification. 159
The Martinsville court, in arguing'in favor of the enforceability
of NOM clauses, ignored the true function of section 2-209(2)
within the vee. As comment three to section 2-209 explains,
"[s]ubsections (2) and (3) are intended to protect against false alle
156. Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1286 (7th
Cir.1986).
157. 2 HAWKLAND supra note 140, § 2-209:03 at 209 ("The elimination of the
need for consideration to make a binding agreement to modify a contract falling within
the scope of Article 2 also eliminated a safeguard that existed at common law against
fraudulent or mistaken allegations that the parties had agreed to changes in the original
contract. "); Frank A. Rothermel, Note, Role of Course of Performance and Confirma
tory Memoranda in Determining the Scope, Operation and Effect of "No Oral Modifica
tion" ClLluses, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1239, 1247-48 (1987) ("NOM clauses were given
effect because they replaced the evidentiary function served by the former requirement
of consideration for contract modifications.").
158. Wisconsin Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1286. Judge Posner explained that "with
consideration no longer required for modification, it was natural to give the parties
some means of providing a substitute for the cautionary and evidentiary function that
the requirement of consideration provides; and the means chosen was to allow them to
exclude oral modifications [under 2-209(2)]." Id.
159. As one commentator explained:
From a pragmatic point of view, the validation of the no-modification-unless
in-writing term makes good sense, because the parties ought to have some way
in which they, themselves, can protect their contract against the uncertainty of
an alleged modification resulting from misunderstanding or fraud. The courts
have had no difficulty in seeing the sense of the rule, and in recognizing the
necessity for it in view of the fact that the protection of the doctrine of consid
eration is no longer available with respect to alleged agreements purporting to
modify sales contracts.
See 2 HAWKLAND, supra note 140, § 2-209:03 at 210.
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gations of oral modifications."160 In other words, section 2-209(2)
permits parties to erect their own Statute of Frauds. However,
when courts are presented with alternative assurances that a modi
fication was actually made by the parties, then there is very little to
recommend the enforceability of a NOM clause. 161 Indeed, within
section 2-209, there is evidence that the enforceability of a NOM
clause is not as hard and fast a rule as the Martinsville majority
would have us believe. 162
It appears that the Martinsville majority distorted the letter
and spirit of Article 2 of the VCC by ignoring the delicate balance
between section 2-209(2) and section 2-209(4). The majority rea
soned that section 2-209(2) provides for the strict .enforcement of
NOM clauses.1 63 However, section 2-209(4) provides that attempts
at modification or rescission, which do not satisfy the requirements
of the NOM clause, may operate as a waiver.164 The Official Com
ment states: "[s]ubsection (4) is intended, despite the provisions of
subsections (2) and (3), to prevent contractual provisions excluding
modification except by a signed writing from limiting in other re
spects the legal effect of the parties' actual later conduct."165 The
Martinsville majority did not discuss the clear tension between sec
tions 2-209(2) and 2-209(4) of the VCC, but based its endorsement
of the VCC approach entirely upon the strong language of section
2-209(2).166 In selectively quoting the language of section 2-209(2),
the majority distorted the operation of section 2-209 specifically
and the spirit of the VCC in general.1 67
Assuming for a moment that the principles of section 2-209 of
the VCC were applied to collective bargaining agreements, the rea
soning of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia would
play out as follows. In the Martinsville case, the Company argued
that the written terms of the CBA. did not provide Vnion represent
atives with the freedom to pursue Vnion business without permis
160. V.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 3.
161. Rothennel, supra note 157, at 1243.
162. V.C.C. § 2-209(4) and cmt. 4.
163. Martinsville Nylon Employees Council v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1263, 1267 (D.c.
Cir.1992).
164. V.C.C. § 2-209(4).
165. V.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 4.
166. Maninsville, 969 F.2d at 1267.
167. See Rothennel, supra note 157, at 1240 n.3 ("[A]lthough the Code's drafters
effected a complete reversal of the common law rule by recognizing the validity of
NOM clauses, they softened the reversal by adding the waiver provision of § 2-209(4).")
(citing E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACI'S § 7.6 at 476 (1982».
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sion from management. Under the principles of section 2-209(2)
and in the face of the CBA's zipper clause, the practices that had
developed at the plant could not be viewed as an enforceable modi
fication.l68 A strong argument could be made, however, that the
Company, in failirtg to object to the practices of the Union repre
sentatives, acquiesced to those practices. Thus, under UCC theory,
it could be argued that such Company acquiescence operated as a
waiver under section 2-209(4).
There are similarities that exist between the Martinsville case
and the facts surrounding a typical transaction in goods. The par
ties in Martinsville did not argue that there was a modification of
their written agreement supported by fresh consideration. Practices
had developed at the plant where Union representatives received
greater latitude in pursuing Union business on Company time.
There is no evidence, however, that the Union or the employees
offered any consideration in return for the representatives' new
found freedoms. If the Union had been able to show some evi
dence of consideration, then the court would have received some
assurance that the CBA had actually been modified.
Additionally, the alleged modification of the CBA was not evi
denced by a' writing. Indeed, this was the main issue in the case.
Within the UCC, the NOM clause plays an evidentiary role that
replaces the assurances typically provided by an exchange of con
sideration. If some other evidence of a bona fide modification is
provided, however, the function of the NOM clause is discharged.
When a NOM clause ceases to serve a function, there is no rational
reason for courts to enforce it,169 The difficulty with the Martins
ville opinion is that it appears to require that there be a writing for
the sake of having a writing. This reasoning, however, is not de
rived from the principles of the UCC.
V.C.C. § 2-209(2).
169. Karl N. Llewellyn, speaking as an advocate of legal realism, stated the
following:
And those involved are folk of modest ideals. They want law to deal, they
themselves want to deal, with things, with people, with tangibles, with definite
tangibles, and observable relations between definite tangibles - not with
words alone; when law deals with words, they want the words to represent
tangibles which can be got at beneath the words, and observable relations be
tween those tangibles. They want to check ideas, and rules, and formulas by
facts, to keep them close to facts. They view rules, they view law, as means to
ends; as only means to ends; as having meaning only insofar as they are means
to ends.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1223 (1931).
168.
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D . .A More Complete Application of Section 2-209 Yields a
Pragmatic Solution

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded
the case to the NLRB to determine if the contested practice was
actually an implementation of the written terms of the CBA.170 The
court then offered one possible interpretation of the facts that
would permit the CBA and the parties' course of performance to be
viewed as consistent. l7l The strength of this position, however, is
questionable, especially because both .the Administrative Law
Judge and the NLRB found the behavior of Union officials to be
clearly inconsistent with the written terms of the CBA.1 72
In holding the zipper clause of the CBA enforceable, the court
left no function for the parties' course of performance beyond that
of defining the written terms.173 A better-reasoned conclusion
would have allowed the parties' course of performance to playa
more substantial role. In the dynamic realm of collective bargain
ing, interpretation of relationships and agreements cannot be
driven by the formality of a NOM clause. Indeed, it is possible that
a practice developed at the facility, which was contrary to the writ
ten terms of the CBA but nevertheless was met with acquiescence.
The day-to-day reality of the parties' activities should not be ig
nored simply because their CBA contains a zipper clause. 174 Nor
should the courts manipulate facts in an attempt to find harmony
with the explicit terms of a contract.
Following the principles of Article 2,175 the Maninsville major
170. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1270.
171. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
172. Martinsville, 969 F.2d at 1269.
173. [d.
174. [d. at 1271.
[U]nion and management may informally agree over an extended period of
time to allow seemingly innocuous practices that are not covered in the con
tract to become part of the settled expectations of the parties, without going
through the formality of amending the contract. It may then be downright
disruptive to the parties' bargaining relations to prevent these firmly estab
lished expectations from being enforced as part of the agreement.
[d. (Wald, J., dissenting).
175. Karl N. Llewellyn rejected the mechanical application of black-letter rules.
As the driving force behind Article 2, Professor Llewellyn sought rules which embraced
the facts and realities of individual situations. Professor Wiseman described Llewellyn's
view as follows:
Faced with rules that no longer fit the facts of sales transactions, the courts in
some cases "construed" the facts in ways that bore no relation to reality but
instead fit the rule. In so doing, courts preserved the rule without addressing
what Llewellyn called the "felt needs" of the case. Alternatively, courts en
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ity should have examined the parties' course of performance to de
termine if certain provisions of the CBA had been waived. Such an
analysis would have allowed the parties' course of performance to
playa more genuine and realistic role in interpreting what had actu
ally transpired between the Union and the Company. If the parties'
actions could be viewed as an attempt at modification or rescission
of the written CBA, then the court should have held that the NOM
clause had been waived.
It is here that the tension between sections 2-209(2) and 2
209(4) comes into full play. The former holds that NOM clauses
are to be enforced, while the latter provides that conduct which
does not meet the requirements of section 2-209(2) may, nonethe
less, operate as a waiver. As one commentator has noted, "[s]ome
courts and commentators have hurriedly concluded that this waiver
provision emasculates the no oni! modification provision because a
party could always claim a waiver of the NOM clause."176 Of
course, common sense dictates that such a conclusion is without
merit. One cannot reasonably argue that the effect of one provision
of the DCC is abrogated by another provision two sentences
laterP7
A more thorough analysis of Article 2 reveals that these two
sections can operate consistently and effectively. It may be force
fully argued that section 2-209(2), when read in conjunction with
section 2-209(4), only bars "mere oral assertions of an oral modifi
cation."178 In the face of a contract containing a NOM clause, no
gaged in "mechanical, deductive reasoning from formulae which crush[ed] to
death some needed, budding, economic institution." The law was, then,
mechanical at best and destructive at worst; it was divorced from reality and
incapable of producing the certainty and predictability especially desirable in
commercial transactions.
Thus, for Llewellyn, the realist, sales law was obsolete in two senses. The
content of the rules of an earlier time did not fit the reality of contemporary
sales transactions, and the form of the rules was derived from a few abstract
doctrines with no specific connections to actual transactions. These "life-re
mote" abstractions were thought to be universally applicable. But Llewellyn
had a notion that law should take a different form.
Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of VISion: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules,
100 HARV. L. REv. 465, 476 (1987) (citations omitted).
176. Rothermel, supra note 157, at 124l.
177. Id. at 1248. See also, Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781
F.2d 1280, 1286 (7th Cir. 1986).
178. Rothermel, supra note 157, at 1243. See also, Wisconsin Knife Works, 781
F.2d at 1286 ("Whether called modification or waiver, what National Metal Crafters is
seeking to do is to nUllify a key term other than by a signed writing. If it can get away
with this merely by testimony about an oral modification, section 2-209(2) becomes
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party may allege that the contract has been modified without offer
ing some supporting evidence. Ifa party is able to offer some evi
dence that provides a safeguard against fraud or fabrication, then
the court should consider whether some portion of the written
agreement has been waived. In this way, courts may guard against
frivolous litigation based solely upon fabricated claims. At the
same time, the flexibility required by the realities of industrial-labor
relations will be retained.
Section 2-208 of the vee, which governs the role of parties'
course of performance in contracts for the sale of goods, lends sup
port to this interpretation. The comment under section 2-208 pro
vides that:
Where it is difficult to determine whether a particular act merely
sheds light on the meaning of the agreement or represents a
waiver of a term of the agreement, the preference is in favor of
"waiver" whenever such construction ... is needed to preserve
the flexible character of commercial contracts and to prevent sur
prise or other hardship.179
The vee seeks to support the realities of commercial transactions
as evidenced by the behavior of the parties. If an act by one party is
met with acquiescence by another party on ten separate occasions,
this course of performance should not be ignored simply because
the parties' contract contains a NOM clause. On the other hand,
inadvertence should not be mistaken for acquiescence.
Instead of relying upon the boilerplate language of the eBA's
zipper clause, the Martinsville court should have completed its
vee analysis by employing the provisions of section 2-209(5). Sec
tion 2-209(5) provides that:
A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory por
tion of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notifi
cation received by the other party that strict performance will be
required of any term waived, unless the retraction would be un
just in view of a material change of position in reliance on the
waiver.1 8o
In Martinsville, the eBA explicitly required that Vnion representa
tives obtain permission before leaving their production posts to
very nearly dead letter."). See also 2 IiAWKLAND, supra note 140, § 2-209:5 at 218 (Pro
fessor Hawkland also offers "an argument against allowing [section 2-209(2)] to be
waived by allegations of oral agreements").
179. V.C.C. § 2-208 emt. 3 (1990).
180. V.C.C. § 2-209(5) (1990).
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pursue Union business. For a period of several years, however, the
Company did not enforce this requirement. Under the principles of
section 2-209, such acquiescence on the part of the Company should
be viewed as a waiver of the permission requirement. However,
section 2-209(5) allows a party to retract its waiver in the absence of
detrimental reliance. The language of section 2-209(5) appears par
ticularly applicable in this situation, in that the NLRB found that
the Company merely attempted "to return to the written terms of
the agreement."181
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia should not have remanded the case to the NLRB to de
termine if the parties' course of performance was simply an imple
mentation of the terms of the written agreement. Instead, the
parties' actions should have been examined to determine if the per
mission requirement of the CBA had been waived. Further, if a
waiver was found, the court should have reviewed the actions of the
Union to determine if it had detrimentally relied on the waiver.
Did the Union representatives fail to make demands for increased
freedoms, believing that they had already obtained them? Did the
Union pursue compensation increases less vigorously in the belief
that it had won a victory in another area? Did the Union fail to
designate an adequate number of Union representatives in the be
lief that the existing number were free to pursue Union business up
to forty hours per week? In the absence of such reliance, the Com
pany should be permitted to retract its waiver and return to the
written terms of the agreement.
CONCLUSION

Flexibility is the hallmark of collective bargaining agreements.
In view of this, the Martinsville majority's formalistic dependence
upon a zipper clause is unsatisfying. Further, a selective reliance
upon section 2-209(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code, holding
NOM clauses to be enforceable, is not the proper solution to the
issue presented.
The Martinsville court should have developed its Code analysis
more fully. Section 2-209(2) is not simply a black-letter rule which
holds NOM clauses enforceable. Instead, it is one fragment of a
statutory construct. To remove section 2-209(2) from the context of
its surrounding provisions distorts both the part and the whole.
181.

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 N.L.R.B: 563, 565 (1989).
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Properly understood, Article 2 provides a set of flexible rules which
embrace the realities of commercial transactions. When the Code is
viewed in this manner, the application of vec principles to a col
lective bargaining dispute seems more obvious than foolish.
Matthew 1. McDermott

